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ABSTRACT
The Safe-Harbor provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act allows generic drug manufacturers to use a
patented invention during pre-market testing of generic drugs. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit’s recent interpretation of the Safe-Harbor provision in Momenta
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc. created controversy when it extended the
Safe-Harbor exemption to post-FDA approval. This extension was done in an unprecedented manner
and would “allow almost all activity by pharmaceutical companies to constitute ‘submission’ and
therefore justify a free license to trespass.” The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to settle this matter, and
courts are now faced with the unenviable task of adopting one of two irreconcilable but binding
interpretations.
This comment analyzes the conflict between the Federal Circuit judges’
interpretations of the Safe-Harbor of the Hatch-Waxman Act. After analyzing the conflict, this
comment offers guidelines that the Supreme Court should consider in limiting the Safe-Harbor
provision in the Hatch-Waxman Act. Further, this comment proposes that courts should grant
compulsory RAND licensing for analytical or diagnostic method patents if the patent is essential and
required to meet the FDA’s standards.
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HATCH-WAXMAN’S SAFE-HARBOR PROVISION FOR PHARMACEUTICAL
DEVELOPMENT: A FREE RIDE FOR PATENT INFRINGERS?
KATE Y. JUNG*
I. INTRODUCTION
In this era of rapid, voluminous growth of biosimilar patent litigation, the Federal
Circuit’s recent and controversial decision in Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc.1 gives brand pharmaceutical companies reason to
worry. The court’s broad interpretation of the Safe-Harbor provision of the HatchWaxman Act, which allows generic drug manufacturers to use a patented invention
during pre-market testing of generic drugs,2 would “allow almost all activity by
pharmaceutical companies to constitute ‘submission’ and therefore justify a free
license to trespass.”3
It has become increasingly difficult to enforce biotechnological and name-brand
pharmaceutical patents involved in drug discovery processes. 4 Congress enacted the
Safe-Harbor to facilitate the development of generic drugs by granting the generic drug
manufacturers the right to use patented drugs for the FDA regulatory approval
process.5 As a result, generic drugs would be immediately available to the public once
a patent expired.6
Due to the broad language of the statute, however, courts have expanded the scope
of the Safe-Harbor.7 Prior to August 3, 2012, the Federal Circuit had limited the SafeHarbor to use in conjunction with obtaining regulatory approval from the Food and
Drug Administration (“FDA”). 8 On August 3, 2012, the Federal Circuit held that the
Safe-Harbor provision extends to post-FDA approval use as well.9 As the Supreme
* © Kate Y. Jung 2014. J.D. Candidate, May 2014, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, IL;
B.S. in Biochemistry (2007), Queen’s University, Canada; M.S. in Biochemistry (2009), Queen’s
University, Canada. I would like to thank Adam Kelly, Professor Arthur Yuan, and Professor
Benjamin Liu for insightful discussions surrounding pharmaceutical patents. I would like to thank
the RIPL editorial board for support and guidance in bringing this comment to publication.
1 Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
2 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)(2006); H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14–15 (1984).
3 Momenta Pharms., 686 F.3d at 1367 (Rader, J., dissenting) (opining that the ultimate result of
the court’s decision in this case repeals the incentives and protections of the patent act).
4 George Fox, Integra v. Merck: Limiting the Scope of the S 271(e)(1) Exception to Patent
Infringement, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 193, 214 (2004).
5 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14–15 (1984).
6 See David J. Bloch, If It’s Regulated Like A Duck . . . Uncertainties in Implementing the Patent
Exceptions of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 111,
122 (1999).
7 See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 207 (2005) (stating that the court
“decline[s] to read the ‘reasonable relation’ requirement so narrowly as to render § 271(e)(1)’s stated
protection of activities leading to FDA approval for all drugs illusory”); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic,
Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 661 (1990) (holding that the use of a patented invention to develop and submit
information for “marketing approval of medical devices” under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act was not infringement).
8 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
9 Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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Court recently passed on an opportunity to settle the matter, 10 courts are faced with
the unenviable task of adopting one of two irreconcilable but binding interpretations.
This comment analyzes whether the Safe-Harbor provision should extend beyond
the field of analytical drug testing after FDA approval. Part I introduces the history
leading to the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Safe-Harbor provision.
Part II discusses the judicial interpretations, focusing on the Momenta case, and the
present scope of the Safe-Harbor provision.
It further examines the likely
consequences and the policy concerns arising from the Momenta holding. Part III
proposes how the Supreme Court should interpret the Safe-Harbor provision, and
suggests amending 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) to narrow the scope of the Safe-Harbor
exemption.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The History of the Hatch-Waxman Act
The Hatch-Waxman Act gives a patent owner the exclusive right to exclude others
from acts that infringe the patent. 11 Prior to this Act, that right was limited by the
common law Experimental Use doctrine.12 The Experimental Use doctrine requires a
determination of the alleged infringer’s intent to infringe the patent. 13 Consequently,
10
11

Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2854, 2854 (2013).
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012). The statute provides:

Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the patentee, his
heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or
selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the
United States, and, if the invention is a process, of the right to exclude others from using,
offering for sale or selling throughout the United States, or importing into the United
States, products made by that process, referring to the specification for the particulars
thereof.
Id.

12 See, e.g., Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from United States
Patent Infringement Liability: Implications for University and Nonprofit Research and Development,
56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917, 918–19 (2004) (“In the Federal Circuit’s four precedential decisions in which
an accused infringer asserted a common law-based experimental use defense, not once has the Federal
Circuit applied the doctrine to absolve liability.”). In 1813, Justice Story penned the Whittemore v.
Cutter decision, in which he established the Experimental Use Doctrine. Id. at 927. In Whittemore,
the defendant alleged that the court abused its discretion by giving a jury instruction that directed a
finding of infringement if the jury found the defendant had made a machine with intent to profit.
Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (D. Mass. 1813). The court rejected his argument and
found the instruction proper. Id. To infringe a patent, the infringer must make with the intent to use
for profit, and not for the mere purpose of philosophical experiment, or to ascertain the verity and
exactness of the specification. Id. at 1121.
13 Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1121 (“[I]t could never have been the intention of the legislature to
punish a man, who constructed such a machine merely for philosophical experiments, or for the
purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects.”). Because
Justice Story does not cite any authority for the rule, one commentator concluded:
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courts have generally held that this exception applied when a minor activity that
would otherwise constitute infringement of a patent was undertaken to verify results
or for philosophical curiosity, rather than for actual commercial use. 14 Primarily, a
number of subsequent courts applied the Experimental Use doctrine when the alleged
infringer had not attempted to obtain any commercial gain or profit from the alleged
activity.15
In Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.,16 the Federal Circuit
asserted the narrow limits of the Experimental Use doctrine within the
pharmaceutical industry.17 Bolar, the generic drug manufacturer, used Roche’s
patented drug six months before the patent was due to expire. 18 The purpose of the
use was to perform necessary tests to obtain FDA approval of the drug’s generic
version.19 Although the District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that
Bolar’s use of the patented drug was de minimis and experimental,20 the Federal
Circuit rejected Bolar’s argument that the use of the patented drug was within the
Experimental Use doctrine.21 The court relied on 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) in determining
that any use of a patented invention during the term of the patent constitutes
infringement.22
Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(“FDCA”), generic drug manufacturers were required to file a New Drug Application
[t]he only explanation for the experimental use exception which seems to make any sense
is that Justice Story, after a brief reflection on the matter, simply felt that the plain
language of the statute could not have really been intended to cover the case of a man
sitting at home in his parlor or basement workshop and tinkering around with a piece of
apparatus as a “philosophical experiment.”
Richard E. Bee, Experimental Use as an Act of Patent Infringement, 39 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 357, 367
(1957).
14 Thomas F. Poche, The Clinical Trial Exemption from Patent Infringement:
Judicial
Interpretation of Section 271(e)(1), 74 B.U.L. REV. 903, 909 (1994) (citing Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at
1121).
15 See, e.g., Standard Measuring Mach. Co. v. Teague, 15 F. 390, 392–93 (D. Mass. 1883)
(explaining a single machine made solely for display at an exhibition did not constitute infringement
because the defendant had not attempted to sell the accused device); Kaz Mfg. Co. v. ChesebroughPonds, Inc., 317 F.2d 679, 681 (2d Cir. 1963) (stating assembly and use of a device shown as a short
advertisement on a television commercial did not constitute infringement because the defendant was
not seeking to market the accused device but was only using it for demonstration).
16 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., Inc. 733 F.2d 858, 867 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
17 Id. at 863.
18 Id. at 860.
19 Id.
20 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., Inc. 572 F. Supp. 255, 258 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
21 Roche Prods., 733 F.2d at 863.
The court rejected Bolar’s reliance on common law
experimental use and held that “the experimental use exception to be truly narrow.” Id. It also noted
that “Bolar’s intended ‘experimental’ use is solely for business reasons and not for amusement, to
satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry.” Id. The court further explained that Bolar’s
use was performed with a “definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purpose[].” Id. Note
that Roche is no longer precedential because of the subsequent enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012).
22 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). “Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into
the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”
Id.
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(“NDA”) to the FDA, which was similar to the name-brand pharmaceutical companies’
filings.23 Each application was supported by its own safety and efficacy studies to show
its generic product was biologically equivalent to the brand drug. 24 This regulatory
approval process frequently took two to three years. 25
This state of affairs resulted in two unintended distortions of the standard patent
term. The first distortion occurred because the lengthy FDA approval process
prevented generic drug manufacturers from bringing a generic drug to the market
upon the expiration of the patent, creating a de facto monopoly for the patentee of the
name-brand drug even after expiration of the patent. 26 For this reason, generic drug
manufacturers have argued that there should be a public policy exemption for
bioequivalency testing before patents expire, to allow the public to enjoy the benefit of
competition in the sale of patented drugs as soon as the patent expires.27
The second distortion applied adversely to the name-brand pharmaceutical
companies. In addition to the lengthy FDA-approval process, the FDA-required testing
was conducted only after a patent issues, which shortened the remaining effective
exclusive term to as short as seven years. 28 The Federal Circuit refused to resolve
these conflicting distortions between the FDCA, which ultimately increased the patent
life due to the lengthy FDA approval process for generic drugs, and the Patent Act of
1952, which Congress intended to grant to patentees only a limited seventeen-year
property right.29 The Federal Circuit in Roche held that balancing the economic and
social interests of name-brand pharmaceutical patentees, generic drug manufacturers,
and the public is “legislative activity proper only for the Congress.” 30
B. Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984
In response to the Roche decision, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, more commonly known as the HatchWaxman Act, to address the distortions in patent terms created by the FDA regulatory

23 Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug
Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 187 (1999).
24 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012). 21 U.S.C. § 355 requires an NDA to contain proof of efficacy
(effectiveness) and safety of drugs, and the FDA must affirmatively approve the NDA. Id. The Federal
Circuit noted that, according to a recent study, a pharmaceutical company may take on average from
seven to ten years to satisfy the current regulatory requirements. Roche Prods., 733 F.2d at 864.
25 Fox, supra note 4, at 210–11.
26 Roche Prods, 733 F.2d at 863–64.
27 Id. at 864–65.
28 See CHARLES C. EDWARDS, THE COMPETITIVE STATUS OF THE U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY 79–80 (Nat’l Academy Press 1983) (citing statement of William M. Wardell to the
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S.
House of Representatives, Feb. 14, 1982, at 14).
29 Daniel E. Troy, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (HatchWaxman Amendments), U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (August 1, 2003),
http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/testimony/ucm115033.htm [hereinafter Troy, Hatch-Waxman]; 21
U.S.C. §§ 301–92.
30 Roche Prods., 733 F.2d at 864.
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process.31 By enacting the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress endeavored to balance two
conflicting policy objectives: (1) to encourage name-brand pharmaceutical firms to
make the investments necessary to research and develop new drug products; and (2)
to accelerate the entry of generic drugs to the market to bring cheaper, generic copies
of those name-brand drugs.32
Further, the Hatch-Waxman Act is divided into two titles. 33 The stated purpose
of Title I is “to make available more low cost generic drugs by establishing a generic
drug approval procedure for pioneer drugs first approved after 1962.” 34 Additionally,
it abolished the lengthy NDA process for generic drug manufacturers and established
an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) process to expedite the FDA approval
process for generic drugs.35 As a result, the generic drug manufacturers are no longer
required to repeat lengthy and costly tests for safety and efficacy determinations. 36
The ANDA process only applies if the generic drugs are used for the same medical
conditions and composed of the same active ingredients as the patented, name-brand
drugs.37
Consequently, generic drug manufacturers only need to satisfy the manufacturing
and bioequivalence requirement of the ANDA process. 38 Additionally, the HatchWaxman Act provided a significant incentive to generic drug manufacturers to file the
31 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, PUB. L. NO. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585 (codified at scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Hatch-Waxman Act];
H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 17–18 (1984).
32 Hatch-Waxman Act, supra note 31, at 1585.
33 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 16, 17 (1984).
34 Id. at 14.
35 Id. at 15. Prior to enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, an ANDA process already existed for
obtaining FDA approval of generic drugs if their equivalent patented drugs were approved by the FDA
before 1963. Id. at 16. The Hatch-Waxman Act extended the ANDA process to the approval of generic
version of patented drugs approved by the FDA after 1962. Id.
36 Id. 16.
37 See generally Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (2012).
The court explained, “Those amendments allow a generic competitor to file an [ANDA] piggy-backing
on the brand’s NDA.” Id. The court continued, “Rather than providing independent evidence of safety
and efficacy, the typical ANDA shows that the generic drug has the same active ingredients as, and
is biologically equivalent to, the brand-name drug.” Id.
38 Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements As Patent Invalidity Signals, 24 HARV. J. LAW & TECH.
281, 291 (2011). Once the ANDA is filed, the generic drug manufacturers must notify the patent
holder claiming that either the patent is invalid or the patent will not be infringed by the manufacture,
use, or sale of the generic drug manufacturers. Id. The patent owner must respond within forty-five
days. Id. If he fails to respond to the notification, it is presumed that no issue of patent law arises
and the FDA will proceed to the approval of the ANDA application. Id. However, most of the time,
the patent owner files suit within forty-five days. Id. The Hatch-Waxman Act makes the filing of the
ANDA “a constructive act of infringement, thus permitting the patent holder to sue for an injunction
against the approval and marketing of the generic drug.” Id. When this occurs, the Hatch-Waxman
Act provides for “an automated stay of the ANDA process” which will remain in effect for thirty months
or until the resolution of the lawsuit, whichever comes first. Id. at 292. If the lawsuit ends in favor
of the ANDA filer, the filer has seventy-five days to begin to market its product or it must forfeit its
180-day exclusivity period. Id. According to Dolin, “[i]t is this provision that permits ANDA filers to
settle suits with patentees while simultaneously keeping the benefits of the exclusivity period.” Id.
at 293; 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B), (j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012) (“If the applicant made a certification described in
subclause (IV) . . . the approval shall be made effective immediately unless, before the expiration of
45 days after the date on which the notice . . . is received, an action is brought for infringement of the
patent.”).
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first ANDA, by granting the first filer a 180-day period of market exclusivity before
subsequent generic drug manufacturers can enter the market. 39 The 180-day period
begins to run when the first filer commercially markets the generic drug or a court
declares the existing patent invalid. 40 Thus, Title I of the Hatch-Waxman Act
successfully allows generic drug manufacturers to provide cheaper and alternative
drugs for the public’s benefit.41
C. The Safe-Harbor Provision
Title II of the Hatch-Waxman Act was proposed to mitigate distortions in patent
terms created by the lengthy FDA regulatory process. 42 The stated purpose of Title II
is “to create a new incentive for increased expenditures for research and development
of certain products which are subject to premarket government approval.” 43 To
counterbalance the benefit to generic drug manufacturers, name-brand
pharmaceutical companies are eligible to extend a patent life period up to a maximum
of five years.44 This is intended to restore the time lost on a patent’s life as result of
the lengthy NDA process.45
In addition, Congress enacted the second section of Title II,46 known as the SafeHarbor provision, to enable the sale of generic drugs immediately after the patent
expires.47 For public policy reasons, it is important that Congress sought to ensure
public access to beneficial new products at competitive market prices immediately
after the expiration of the terms of relevant patents. 48 Thus, the Safe-Harbor provision
provides a statutory exception to patent infringement liability. 49 It states that it is not
an act of infringement “to make, use, offer to sell, or sell . . . a patented invention” for
the sole purpose of developing and submitting information under a federal law that
“regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.”50
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
Id.
41 See generally Harold C. Wegner, Post-Merck Experimental Use and the “Safe Harbor,” 15 FED.
CIR. B.J. 1, 21–22 (2005).
42 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 15 (1984).
43 Id.
44 35 U.S.C. §§ 156(c), 156(g)(6) (2012).
45 See id.
46 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 15 (1984).
47 Id.
48 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 678 (1990) (construing § 271(e)(1) as the
Court of Appeals decided that medical devices are included, “one must posit a good deal of legislative
imprecision; but to construe it as petitioner would, one must posit that and an implausible substantive
intent as well”).
49 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
50 Id. Section 202 of Title II of the Hatch-Waxman Act was codified as 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1),
which states:
39
40

[i]t shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the
United States or import into the United States a patented invention . . . solely for
uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a
Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary
biological products.
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Ultimately, the Safe-Harbor provision permits generic drug manufacturers to
engage in otherwise infringing activities during the life of a patent, as long as the use
is reasonably related to the submission of information under federal law regulating the
sale of drugs.51 Due to the broad language of this statute, a proper interpretation of
the Safe-Harbor provision requires an understanding of the legislative history. 52
The legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman Act suggests that the Safe-Harbor
provision should be read very narrowly and strictly. 53 Commentators have described
it as “limited to human drug products, and [not inclusive of] medical devices, animal
drugs, food additives, color additives, or other related products.” 54 Some Committee
members raised concerns and proposed amendments to the Safe-Harbor provision,
arguing that such provision restricts the exclusive right of the patent holder. 55
Congress rejected these amendments, however, and reasoned that the patent holder
still retains the right to exclude others from the major commercial marketplace during
the life of the patent.56 Although Congressional opponents and proponents of the SafeHarbor provision had different views concerning the patent rights, they shared the
view that the provision should have a limited scope confined to the facts and
circumstances presented in Roche.57
Thus, Congress unambiguously had a narrow view of the Safe-Harbor provision
in which the “only activity” allowed under this section was a limited amount of
bioequivalency testing undertaken by “generic manufacturers.” 58
However,
subsequent judicial interpretations have gradually expanded the scope of the HatchWaxman’s Safe-Harbor exemption.
II. ANALYSIS
How broadly the Safe-Harbor provision should be read is a point of controversy in
the legal community. Because of its broad language, courts have struggled to
determine the scope of the infringement exemption created by the Safe-Harbor
provision.59 Consequently, courts are split as to how they should interpret the statute.

Id.

51 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 45 (1984). The stated purpose of this provision is “to
establish that experimentation with a patented drug product, when the purpose is to prepare for
commercial activity which will begin after a valid patent expires, is not a patent infringement.” Id.;
see also Brian Coggio & F. Dominic Cerrito, The Safe Harbor Provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act:
Present Scope, New Possibilities, and International Considerations, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 161, 161-62
(2002).
52 See generally Fox, supra note 4, at 204–05.
53 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 25–26 (1984).
54 See generally Ellen J. Flannery & Peter Barton Hutt, Balancing Competition and Patent
Protection in the Drug Industry: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
40 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 269, 308 (1985).
55 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 29 (1984).
56 See generally Fox, supra note 4, at 198.
57 See generally id. at 199–200.
58 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 8 (1984).
59 See generally Coggio & Cerrito, supra note 51, at 162–63. Courts have generally agreed that
the purpose of the Safe-Harbor is to provide exemption from a patent infringement suit where the
testing of the patented invention is for (1) the purpose of securing regulatory approval from the FDA
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Some judges argue that the provision should be read broadly, because it was
intentionally written without restrictive words. 60 The Supreme Court has reasoned
that if Congress intended to limit the exemption, then it would have clearly expressed
that intent in the statute.61 On the other hand, some judges have found that the SafeHarbor provision was approved because it was “limited in time, quantity, and type.” 62
Thus, they believe the provision should only apply to FDA’s premarketing approval
and would not apply to commercial sales. 63
The legislature emphasized the narrowness of the exemption by stating that “a
generic drug manufacturer may obtain a supply of a patented drug product during the
life of the patent and conduct tests using that product if the purpose of those tests is
to submit an application to FDA for approval.”64 It further stated that “the only activity
which will be permitted by the bill is a limited amount of testing so that generic
manufacturers can establish the bioequivalency of a generic substitute. The patent
holder retains the right to exclude others from the major commercial marketplace
during the life of the patent.” 65 As a result, the court in Scripps Clinic & Research
and (2) to prepare for commercial activity which will begin after a valid patent expires. See generally
Fox, supra note 4, at 197–98.
60 See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 672–73 (1990) (expanding the types
of “patented inventions” under the Safe-Harbor exemption to include all inventions and not just those
limited to drug-related invention, holding that the development of medical devices should be treated
similarly to the development of drugs); Intermedics v. Ventritex Co., No. 92-1976, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 3620, at *16–17 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 22, 1993); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,
Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19361, at *26–28 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 207 (2005).
61 See, e.g., Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 667 (“If only the former patents were meant to be included,
there were available such infinitely more clear and simply ways of expressing that intent that it is
hard to believe the convoluted manner petitioner suggests was employed would have been selected.”).
62 Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d. 1348, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(Rader, J., dissenting); see also Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp.
1379, 1396 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (adopting the narrower interpretation of the Safe-Harbor provision by
reading “solely” as modifying “reasonably related” so that the infringing party must demonstrate that
it made and used the patented invention “solely” for the purpose of meeting FDA reporting
requirement).
63 Momenta Pharms., 686 F.3d. 1348, 1364 (Rader, J., dissenting).
The purpose of the foregoing provision is to permit a generic drug manufacturer to
engage in the limited experimental activities which are necessary to obtain FDA premarketing approval before a patent expires so that actual competition between the
generic drug and the original drug can begin immediately after the patent covering
the original drug expires. Section 202 does not authorize any activity which would
deprive the patent owner of the sale of a single tablet during the life of a valid
patent. In fact, the limited testing activity required to obtain FDA approval of a
generic drug would not normally result in the use of even a single generic tablet for
its therapeutic purpose during the life of a valid patent.
Id. (quoting Innovation and Patent Law Reform: Hearing on H.R. 3605 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 926
(1984)) (emphases adjusted); H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 45 (1984) (stating that the Safe-Harbor
provision “does not permit the commercial sale of a patented drug by the party using the drug to
develop such information, but it does permit the commercial sale of research quantities of active
ingredients to such party”).
64 Momenta Pharms., 686 F.3d at 1364 (emphasis in original).
65 Scripps Clinic, 666 F. Supp. at 1396.
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Foundation v. Genentech, Inc.66 held that the Safe-Harbor exemption applies to those
activities that are solely related to the development and submission of information to
the FDA.67
A conflict between Federal Circuit judges’ interpretations of the exemption led to
contradictory decisions in the recent cases of Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen
IDEC.68 and Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc.69
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court recently denied a petition for writ of certiorari in
both cases70 and thus, missed the opportunity to resolve the conflicting decisions of the
Federal Circuit. Consequently, courts are now faced with the unenviable task of
adopting one of two irreconcilable but binding interpretations.
Although the Supreme Court denied cert in these cases now, the Court will
eventually have to settle the Safe-Harbor exemption issue because the Federal Circuit
judges have opposing views and interpretations of the Safe-Harbor provision in the
Hatch-Waxman Act. Judge Moore, who dissented in Classen, wrote the Momenta
decision. Judge Rader, who joined in the majority opinion in Classen, wrote a vigorous
dissent in Momenta. In the Momenta decision, Judge Moore did not follow the
precedent in Classen, thus yielding a contradictory result. Unless the Supreme Court
sets clear guidelines as to how to interpret the Safe-Harbor provision, future decisions
will depend solely on which judge gets one extra vote.
Further, Classen held that the Safe-Harbor provision does not apply to
information that may be routinely reported to the FDA after marketing approval has
been obtained.71 The court reasoned that the provision sought to expedite development
of information for regulatory approval of generic counterparts of patented products. 72
It relied heavily on the clear legislative history and the purported purposes of the
Hatch-Waxman Act.73 The opinion also stated that the Safe-Harbor only applies to
pre-approval activities.74
Consequently, the court held that the Safe-Harbor
exemption is limited to the premarketing approval of generic drugs, and the infringing
use after FDA market approval does not qualify as such an exemption.75

Id. at 1396.
Id.
68 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding
that the Safe-Harbor provision should not extend beyond the pre-FDA premarketing approval of
generic drugs).
69 Momenta Pharms., 686 F.3d at 1357 (extending the Safe-Harbor provision to the post-FDA
approval). Although Amphastar was the first generic drug manufacturer to file an ANDA on the
generic version of Lovenox (enoxaparin) to the FDA, Momenta received the FDA approval a year before
Amphastar, and was the first to bring generic enoxaparin to the market. Id. at 1351. Lovenox is a
drug that prevents blood clots. Id. at 1349. The generic enoxaparin is a low molecular weight of
heparin, which is a naturally occurring molecule. Id. Heparin is a complex polysaccharide that have
“considerable diversity in (1) the length of the polysaccharide chain and (2) in the component
disaccharide units and the corresponding distribution of disaccharide unit sequences in the
polysaccharide chains.” Id. at 1349.
70 GlaxoSmithKline v. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 973, 973 (2013); Momenta
Pharms. Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms. Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2854, 2854 (2013).
71 Classen, 659 F.3d at 1070.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 1071.
74 Id. at 1070.
75 Id.
66
67
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However, only a year after its decision in Classen, the Federal Circuit announced
its seemingly contradictory decision in Momenta.76 In that case, the FDA required an
ANDA applicant for a generic drug, enoxaparin, to establish sameness because of the
complicated scientific and regulatory issues attendant to approval of generic
enoxaparin.77 In order to satisfy this requirement, Momenta developed and patented
a set of “manufacturing control processes” to confirm that each batch of its generic
product contained a certain percentage of the unique sugars which correspond to the
characteristic of enoxaparin.78 Further, the FDA required generic drug manufacturers
of enoxaparin to retain all records associated with a produced batch of drugs for
authorized inspection by the FDA.79
Subsequent to the issuance of Momenta’s analytical method patent, the FDA
approved Amphastar’s ANDA for generic enoxaparin.80 Momenta sued Amphastar for
infringement of its analytical method patent for manufacturing generic enoxaparin for
commercial sale using the claimed methods.81 Following Classen, the District Court of
Massachusetts held that the Safe-Harbor exemption did not apply to Amphastar’s
post-FDA approval testing based primarily on the legislative history of the SafeHarbor.82
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and held that
Amphastar’s action does fall within the scope of the Safe-Harbor exemption.83
Contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.,84 the
Federal Circuit found that the Safe-Harbor provision is unambiguous by omitting
critical statutory language: “solely” and “submission.”85 It further stated that the
Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 184, 188 (D. Mass. 2011).
Because Enoxaparin is produced by breaking the complex heparin polysaccharide into smaller pieces,
called oligosaccharides, the enoxaparin is made up of a mixed variety of oligosaccharides units
corresponding to the diversity in the original mix of heparin molecules. Id. at 187. The brand-name
pharmaceutical company that manufactured Lovenox petitioned to the FDA that its generic version
required careful analysis. Id. at 188. In response, the FDA imposed five criteria to ensure its
“sameness:” (1) the physical and chemical characteristics of enoxaparin, (2) the nature of the source
material and the method used to break up the polysaccharide chains into smaller fragments, (3) the
nature and arrangement of components that constitute enoxaparin, (4) certain laboratory
measurements of anticoagulant activity, and (5) certain aspects of the drug’s effect in humans. Id.
78 Id. at 188.
79 Momenta Pharms., 686 F.3d at 1357 (requiring records to be available for at least one year
after the expiration date of the batch).
80 Id. at 1351.
81 Id. at 1351, 1352.
82 Momenta Pharms., 882 F. Supp. 2d at 196 (emphasizing that the only activity that is permitted
by the Safe-Harbor provision is a limited amount of testing for purposes of submitting data for FDA
approval) (citing Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1071 (Fed. Cir.
2011)).
83 Momenta Pharms., 686 F.3d at 1361.
84 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 661 (1990).
85 Momenta Pharms., 686 F.3d at 1362 (Rader, J., dissenting); Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 669 (1990)
(finding that the statute can be ambiguous and “not plainly comprehensible”). The court disagreed
with the dissenting opinion that the words “solely” and “submitted” limit the statute to pre-approval
activities. Id. at 1359–60. But see id. at 1367 (Rader, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that omitting the
word “solely” is not proper reading of the Safe-Harbor provision and that Amphastar’s activity is not
within the statute because its use was not solely for developing and submitting information to the
FDA).
76
77
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FDA’s requirement to maintain records is “reasonably related” to submitting to the
FDA.86
Additionally, the court tried to distinguish Momenta from Classen by emphasizing
that: (1) Amphastar’s submission to the FDA in this case was not “routine” and (2) the
FDA mandated the performance of the patented studies. 87 The Court stated that this
analysis “is not groundbreaking” because the Supreme Court came to essentially the
same conclusion in Eli Lilly.88
However, as Judge Rader in the dissent noted, there is nothing in Eli Lilly that
suggests the exemption goes beyond the premarketing approval of generic
counterparts before patent expiration.89 In Classen and in the dissent in Momenta, he
emphasized that the Safe-Harbor exemption was only intended for limited
“experimental use” for purposes of submitting data to the FDA for approval. 90 Judge
Rader believed that the mere fact that the activities were “mandated by the FDA” could
not justify Amphastar’s infringing use.91 Momenta spent time, money, and effort to
invent the first and best method to satisfy the FDA requirement.92 Because Momenta’s
method was so successful, the FDA adopted that method as a standard. 93 That does
not mean, however, that the FDA intended for every other generic drug manufacturer
to freely use Momenta’s patented method without violating Momenta’s exclusive
right.94 Amphastar was free to invent its own method, but instead chose to trespass. 95
Further, it is also “questionable whether Momenta’s patented analytical
method . . . even qualifies as a ‘patented invention’ that is subject to this ‘safe harbor’
provision.”96 Unlike the prior cases, Momenta did not involve the use of a brand-name
drug patent to obtain FDA approval. It involved the use of an analytical method patent
for biosimilarity, which is required after FDA approval in order to maintain the
approval.
The Supreme Court held in Eli Lilly that “patented inventions” extend to medical
devices reasonably related to the development and submission of information to the

Momenta Pharms., 686 F.3d at 1357.
Id. at 1353.
88 Id. at 1355. However, nothing in either Eli Lilly or Merck suggests that the Supreme Court
intended the “safe harbor” to reach post-FDA approval activity. See generally Eric W. Guttag,
Momenta Pharmaceuticals: The Hatch-Waxman “Safe Harbor” Widens to Include Post-FDA Approval
Activity, IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 7, 2012, 10:27 AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/08/07/momentapharmaceuticals-the-hatch-waxman-safe-harbor-widens-to-include-post-fda-approvalactivity/id=27191/ [hereinafter Guttag, Momenta Pharmaceuticals]
89 Momenta Pharms., 686 F.3d at 1368 (Rader, J., dissenting).
90 Id. at 1364–65.
91 Id. at 1369.
92 Id. at 1362. Some scholars doubt “whether Momenta’s patented analytical method . . . even
qualifies as a ‘patented invention’ that is subject to this ‘safe harbor’ provision.” Guttag, Momenta
Pharmaceuticals, supra note 88.
93 Momenta Pharms., 686 F.3d at 1370 (Rader, J., dissenting).
94 Id. at 1369. Momenta’s decision is already criticized by scholars that the court made “its own
independent interpretation” of the Safe-Harbor provision. See generally Kevin E. Noonan, Momenta
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharmacueticals, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2012), PATENT DOCS BIOTECH &
PHARMA PATENT LAW & NEWS BLOG (Aug. 9, 2012, 11:59 PM), http://www.patentdocs
.org/2012/08/momenta-pharmaceuticals-inc-v-amphastar-pharmaceuticals-inc-fed-cir-2012.html.
95 Momenta Pharms., 686 F.3d at 1369 (Rader, J., dissenting).
96 Guttag, Momenta Pharmaceuticals, supra note 88.
86
87
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FDA for the purpose of obtaining marketing approval for a medical device.97 The Court
reasoned that if Congress intended to limit the exemption to only drug patents, then
they would have clearly expressed that intent in the statute.98 However, Momenta is
distinguishable from Eli Lilly because the use was not for obtaining FDA approval.
Thus, analytical method patents may not be within the definition of a “patented
invention” which the Safe-Harbor provision intends to exempt.
Judge Rader stated that the court “rewrote” the law, contrary to legislative history
and precedent, to allow Amphastar’s infringement “throughout the entire life of
Momenta’s patent and for the purpose of obtaining profits on commercial sales of a
product that competes with the patentee.”99 He pointed out that this new
interpretation would “allow almost all activity by pharmaceutical companies to
constitute ‘submission’ and therefore justify a free license to trespass.” 100
Consequently, manufacturing method patents will become worthless because no
incentive remains to invest in developing a better test. 101 Judge Rader highlights that
this approach ultimately violates the essence of the patent law and future research
incentives in this field.102
On the other hand, some scholars have shown concern that patenting the
“analytical process for demonstrating biosimilarity” raises a problem, especially when
“there are no practical, alternative methods available for demonstrating
biosimiliarity.”103 Thus, unless the Safe-Harbor provision applies, the owner of the
analytical process patent can potentially prevent competitors from bringing a
biosimilar to market because competitors could not demonstrate biosimilarity required
by the FDA without infringing the patent.104
At the same time, it is strongly suggested that the use of the patented analytical
method for the purpose of manufacturing a product to sell on the market falls outside
of the protected scope of the Safe-Harbor provision.105 Clear guideline is required,
where courts agree on the scope of the Safe-Harbor provision to avoid such conflicting
results between the courts and judges.

97 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 661 (1990) (holding that the Safe-Harbor
provision is not limited to drugs only).
98 Id. at 667. The court pointed out, “If only the former patents were meant to be included, there
were available such infinitely more clear and simpl[e] ways of expressing that intent that it is hard to
believe the convoluted manner petitioner suggests was employed would have been selected.” Id.
99 Momenta Pharms., 686 F.3d at 1366 (Rader, J., dissenting) (emphases omitted). The dissent
strongly argued that this unwarranted expansion of the law circumvents the purpose of the patent
law. Id. In addition, it completely ignores the legislative history (which is strongly supported in
binding precedents), which strongly suggest that the intention of the Safe-Harbor provision applied
only in limited situations, namely pre-approval experiments to obtain FDA approval. Id. (citing
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1070–71 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
100 Momenta Pharms., 686 F.3d at 1367 (Rader, J., dissenting). The ultimate result of the court’s
decision in this case repeals the incentives and protections of the patent act. Id.
101 Id. at 1362.
102 Id. at 1362, 1375–76.
103 Chris Holman, Momenta v. Amphastar: A Divided Federal Circuit Panel Addresses Scope of
Hatch-Waxman Safe Harbor for Post-Approval Activities, HOLMAN’S BIOTECH IP BLOG (Oct. 4, 2012,
12:49
PM),
http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.ca/2012/10/momenta-v-amphastara-dividedfederal.html.
104 Momenta Pharms., 686 F.3d at 1369–70, 1375–76 (Rader, J., dissenting).
105 See Guttag, Momenta Pharmaceuticals, supra note 88.
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III. PROPOSAL
This section proposes that (1) the Safe-Harbor provision in the Hatch-Waxman
Act should not extend beyond the pre-FDA premarketing approval of generic drugs
and (2) the Court should impose compulsory “reasonable and non-discriminatory
terms” (“RAND”) licenses if the patentee intended to commercialize its patent or if
there is no other alternative. Every decision examining the statute has appreciated
that the Safe-Harbor provision is directed to premarketing approval of generic
counterparts before a patent expires.106 Thus, Momenta extended the Safe-Harbor
provision beyond its statutory language and was inconsistent with the legislative
intent and judicial interpretation as to when the provision applies. 107
A. Limited to pre-FDA approval
The Safe-Harbor provision was enacted, intended, and judicially interpreted to
apply to limited activities that are conducted to obtain pre-FDA marketing approval of
generic counterparts of patented inventions. 108 Extending it to the post-FDA approval
creates a direct conflict with the prior judicial interpretation in Classen.109 The
Federal Circuit explicitly held that Classen’s method patents did not fall under the
Safe-Harbor exemption because the exemption does not include such activities
targeted at gaining market approval.110 It was noted that the provision does not extend
to the information that may be routinely reported to the FDA after marketing approval
has been obtained.111
Additionally, courts have considered and should continue to consider clear
legislative intent while interpreting the Safe-Harbor provision.112 The Safe-Harbor
provision was provided in order to expedite development of information for regulatory
approval of generic counterparts of patented products. 113 Further, it is clearly stated
in the House Report that the provision exempts generic drug manufacturers from
patent infringement if the use was “to import or to test a patented drug in preparation
for seeking FDA approval, if marketing of the drug would occur after expiration of the
patent.”114 The Report is replete with statements that the legislation concerns
premarketing approval of generic drugs and emphasizes that “[t]he information which
can be developed under this provision is the type which is required to obtain approval
of the drug.”115 There is nothing in the Report that suggests that Congress intended
to expand the Safe-Harbor provision beyond the pre-FDA approval.
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1071–72 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 8–9 (1984); Momenta Pharms., 686 F.3d at 1371-72 (Rader,
J., dissenting).
108 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 8–9 (1984).
109 Classen, 659 F.3d at 1070.
110 Id. (involving analytical method for studies to evaluate the association between the timing of
child vaccination and the development of immune-mediated disorders).
111 Id.
112 Id. at 1071.
113 Troy, Hatch-Waxman, supra note 29; Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., Inc., 733 F.2d
858, 864 (Fed. Cir. 1984); 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–92 (2012).
114 Classen, 659 F.3d at 1071 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 15 (1984)) (emphasis added).
115 Id.
106
107
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Further, Congress certainly did not intend to apply the Safe-Harbor exemption to
commercial sales. The purpose of the provision was to respond to two unintended
distortions of the seventeen-year patent term, which resulted from the long process of
premarket regulatory FDA approval.116 So the Safe-Harbor provision exempts generic
drug manufacturers, allowing them to use the patented drug before the patent expires,
for the sole purpose of obtaining the regulatory approval for their generic counterparts.
This allows generic drug manufacturers to enter into the market immediately after
patent expiration.117 Thus, the Safe-Harbor was never meant to be applied to
commercial sales during the life of the patent.118
However, there has been a full-blown scholarly and judiciary debate as to how
statutes should be generally read: textualism versus intentionalism. 119 It is important
to read the statute on its face, and according to Justice Scalia, the legislative intent is
irrelevant if the text is plain and unambiguous. 120 From this view, it logically follows
that when the statute language is ambiguous, courts should consider the legislative
intent to interpret the statute.121 The ambiguity can be inferred from the existing
dispute between judges as to how the statute should be read. Contrary to the
majority’s opinion in Momenta, it stands to reason that the Safe-Harbor provision is
ambiguous because courts have been going back and forth about how far the provision
extends.

H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 15 (1984).
Id. There has been extensive precedent that recites the purpose of the Safe-Harbor provision
and there has been no dispute as to what that is, which is to facilitate market entry upon patent
expiration. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(stating that the Safe-Harbor provision enabled “generic manufacturers to test and seek approval to
market during the patent term”); Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256, 1265
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (examining for purposes of the exemption whether the infringer is “seeking FDA
approval [for a product] in order to enter the market to compete with patentees”).
118 Guttag, Momenta Pharmaceuticals, supra note 88.
119 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 59, 65 (1988). Textualism, a formalist theory of statutory interpretation, suggests that
the statute should be interpreted by “look[ing] at the statutory structure and hear[ing] the words as
they would sound in the mind of a skilled, objectively reasonable user of words.” Id. Thus, the
textualist does not give weight to legislative history materials when attempting to ascertain the
meaning of a text. Id. at 60–61. Textualist judges have contended that courts should not treat
committee reports as authoritative evidence of legislative intent. Id. at 60. These judges reasoned
that (1) a 535-member legislature has no “genuine” collective intent concerning the proper resolution
of statutory ambiguity and even if it did it would be hard to prove that the “intent” was of Congress
as a whole, (2) giving weight to legislative history offends the constitutionally mandated process of
bicameralism and presentment. John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 673, 675 (1997).
120 See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 406–08 (1998).
121 See e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39 (1998) (“The simple existence of
some statutory ambiguity . . . is not sufficient to warrant application of [the rule of lenity], for most
statutes are ambiguous to some degree . . . . To invoke the rule, we must conclude that there is a
‘grievous ambiguity or uncertainty’ in the statute.”); United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 311 (1992)
(Thomas, J., concurring-in-part and concurring-in-the-judgment) (noting that “the rule [of lenity]
operates only ‘at the end of the process’ of construction, if ambiguity remains ‘even after a court has
seize[d] every thing from which aid can be derived’”). Under law as legislative intent, where both the
text of a statute and the enacting Congress’ intent are clear but contradict one another, the clear
intent of the enacting Congress prevails. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism,
37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 646–50 (1990).
116
117
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Therefore, limiting the scope of the exemption for the purpose of obtaining the
pre-FDA marketing approval would protect the primary purpose and intent of the SafeHarbor provision.
B. Compulsory “Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory Terms” (“RAND”) Licensing
The Momenta decision raised some concerns and fears among analytical method
patent holders. If the Supreme Court decides to uphold Momenta, it will discourage
drug manufacturers from disclosing their new analytical method. One of the reasons
why the patent law grants an exclusive right to exclude others from acts that infringe
the patent is to encourage new innovations that benefit the public. 122 At the same
time, as a matter of public policy it is important to introduce generic counterparts of
beneficial drugs as soon as possible, so that they are available to the public for a
reasonable and affordable price. Thus, it is important to interpret the Safe-Harbor
provision in a way that balances the need for innovation against public health
concerns.
The author submits that a system of compulsory “reasonable and nondiscriminatory” (“RAND”) licensing would provide courts with a practical method for
achieving that balance. Reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, also known as “fair,
reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms” (“FRAND”) in Europe, are a licensing
obligation that is often required by standards organizations. 123 The standard-setting
organizations (“SSOs”) set common standards for a particular industry in order to
prevent members from monopolizing the market by engaging in patent licensing abuse:
refusing to license or charging excessively high royalty rates.124 Therefore, companies
with patents that have been selected for a standard are obligated to RAND
commitment because its patent is “essential” and thus “required” to meet the
standard.125
Under such a system, courts would determine whether analytical method patents
were “essential” and “required” to meet the FDA’s standards. For example, compulsory
RAND licensing is applicable in Momenta where the use of patent was “essential” to
meet the FDA’s standards. If there is absolutely no alternative to design around the
patent to achieve the similar result, the compulsory RAND licensing should be granted
in order to prevent an unreasonable monopoly. For example, if the generic drug
manufacture has a patented analytical process, it can potentially prevent other generic
companies to enter into the market, thus creating a monopoly of the generic drug after
the brand-named drug patent expires. Preventing the generic drugs from entering
freely into the market after the brand-named patent expires is contrary to what the
Safe-Harbor provision intended.126 Thus, courts have to balance the patentees’
exclusive rights with the importance of availability of the generic drugs for the public.

AMY L. LANDERS, UNDERSTANDING PATENT LAW 10–14 (1st ed., LexisNexis 2008).
Anne Layne-Farrar et al., Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations:
Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 671 (2007).
124 Id. at 672.
125 Id.
126 See Wegner, supra note 41, at 2.
122
123
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The Safe-Harbor exemption was only intended for limited “experimental use” for
purposes of submitting data to the FDA for approval.127 The fact that the FDA
mandated the activities cannot justify the infringing use. 128 If such activities are
required after FDA approval, they should be supported by proper patent licensing.
Thus, a compulsory license would allow a patentee to still enjoy a commercial benefit
from its analytical or diagnostic method patent, and at the same time would fulfill the
benefit of providing cheaper alternative generic drugs to the public at a faster rate.
IV. CONCLUSION
Extending the Safe-Harbor exemption in the Hatch-Waxman Act to post-FDA
approval was done in an unprecedented manner, and contradicted the clear intent of
the legislature. Consequently, manufacturing analytical or diagnostic method patents
will have less value because there is no incentive to invest in developing a better test.
The Supreme Court should consider the clear legislative intent and prior judicial
decisions, and limit the Safe-Harbor provision in the Hatch-Waxman Act to only apply
to obtaining pre-FDA marketing approval. Furthermore, the court should grant
compulsory RAND licensing for analytical or diagnostic method patents if the patent
is essential and required to meet the FDA’s standards.

127 Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1367, 1375–76 (Rader,
J., dissenting).
128 Id. at 1369.

